Turkey’s Russian-Made S-400 Is Too Politically Costly to Get Rid of

• Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400s got it kicked out of the F-35 program and drew US sanctions.
• Despite those penalties, Turkey has held on to its S-400s, but it hasn’t made them operational.
• Ankara has kept its S-400s around because the political cost of ditching them is too high.

Six years after Turkey agreed to buy Russia’s S-400 air-defense system and four years after the US responded by kicking Ankara out of the F-35 program, Turkey’s S-400 still isn’t operational, but the Turkish government hasn’t backed away from the deal.

Turkey’s attachment to the S-400 reflects a dynamic in which the weapon was imbued with major political significance in Turkey, making it costly for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to relent even as the drawbacks became clear, according to two academics who researched how Erdogan’s party, its backers, and others in Turkey portrayed the weapon.

Turkey signed the deal with Russia in 2017 despite opposition from Ankara’s NATO allies, who feared the Russian-made weapon system would compromise the F-35 program, in which Ankara was a manufacturing partner, and allow Russia to gain valuable information about the stealth aircraft.

The US expelled Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, after Ankara received its first S-400 delivery, and sanctioned Turkey’s defense industry the following year.

The S-400 was touted as one of the world’s most advanced air-defense systems and many countries expressed interest in acquiring it. However, experts have raised doubts about its capabilities, especially when it is not properly integrated with other air-defense systems.

Turkey’s S-400 lacks that integration, as it hasn’t been connected to NATO’s radar network because alliance members fear that doing so could expose other systems to Russian observation. Without that connection, Turkey’s air-defense network would have “blind spots” that limit the S-400’s effectiveness, according to Lisel Hintz, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, and David E. Banks, a professor at King’s College London.

In a paper published in December, Hintz and Banks argue that Erdogan has been unable to back down from the S-400 deal despite its disadvantages due to the importance his government, its allies, and others in Turkey attached to it and the domestic pressures created as a result.

Tied to a symbol

Turkey has kept its nonoperational S-400s around because they have taken on symbolic significance for important constituencies of Erdogan’s AKP party — namely, Turkish far-left and far-right nationalist figures and former military leaders, Hintz and Banks write.

By going ahead with the S-400 deal and keeping the system despite US opposition, the AKP benefited politically with left- and right-wing nationalist audiences in Turkey. This was important for AKP as it faced “growing dissent” at home due to a worsening economy and sought the support of the country’s nationalist elements, especially in the run-up to Turkey’s 2023 elections, Hintz and Banks argue.

At the same time, there was growing distrust of the US in Turkey, where audiences increasingly saw Washington as an antagonist.

Top Turkish officials accused Washington of being behind the failed 2016 coup against Erdogan’s government. The US decision to arm Syrian Kurdish militants against ISIS further soured relations between the NATO allies. (Ankara considers Syrian Kurds to be affiliated with the Kurdish PKK, which both the US and Turkey deem a terrorist group.)

That made Russia’s S-400 seem like not only a valid alternative but a preferable option to the US-made Patriot missile-defense system. (The US withdrew Patriot batteries from Turkey in late 2015, adding to Turkish concerns and desire for another air-defense system.)

For nationalist audiences, the S-400 became a symbol of “Turkish defiance” against the US, making it “prohibitively costly” for Erdogan’s party to back away from it, even after the US sanctioned Turkey’s defense industry, Hintz and Banks write.

A different pole within NATO

Hintz and Banks also found a “counterhegemonic” narrative in Turkey, which downplayed Ankara’s role in NATO and emphasized its role as “a powerful local actor pushing back against US and NATO influence in the Middle East and Eurasia.”

Encapsulating this narrative, shortly before Turkey received its first S-400 components, the country’s interior minister said the weapon “is a declaration of independence.”

This narrative and Turkish mistrust of the US gave Erdogan a potent symbol with which to cast himself as an “accomplished regional leader” and appeal to supporters, Hintz and Banks write, noting that Erdogan referenced the S-400 at hundreds of events.

This counterhegemonic narrative was promoted by non-AKP figures, including members of the main opposition party, voices on the extreme left and extreme right, and former high-ranking military officials. This meant sticking with the S-400 gave Erdogan and his party political benefits, but it also made it politically costlier for Ankara to abandon what is now seen as a suboptimal air-defense system and to mend its relationship with NATO, according to Hintz and Banks.

Tellingly, in February 2021, Turkey’s defense minister signaled that Ankara could work out a compromise for the S-400s — comments that drew heavy backlash against the AKP from nationalist circles. The party was forced to retract the minister’s comments.

New missiles for a new era

There have been more signs that Turkey’s government is considering leaving the S-400 behind despite the potential political cost.

Ankara has yet to buy a second batch of S-400s from Russia, even though Erdogan has expressed his intention to do so and Moscow claims that a second batch will be delivered.

In March 2022, Turkey’s defense minister said the country is in discussions with France and Italy to conclude a 2018 agreement that would give Turkey the Franco-Italian SAMP/T air-defense system. After the initial signing, the deal went into limbo over reported political disagreements and Turkey never received the system.

Turkish firms are also developing an array of air-defense systems, including short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. Although these may not be operational for years, they reflect a desire to reduce Turkey’s reliance on other countries to defend its airspace.

“We are making air defense systems. We don’t need S-300s, S-400s,” the chairman of a Turkish defense equipment manufacturer said in March. “We are eliminating the need for them. This is our duty.”